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Recent FERC Efforts to Remedy Inadequate 
Transmission Capacity and the Implications for the 
Development of Wind Power 
Brian M. Bowman
* 
INTRODUCTION 
In accordance with the Federal Power Act, the United States 
Department of Energy (“DOE”) is required to conduct a study 
every three years that examines electric transmission congestion 
and constraints within the nation’s power grid.1 The most recent 
DOE National Electric Transmission Congestion Study 
(“NETCS”) was published in December 20092 and, by order of the 
American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, included an 
“analysis of significant potential sources of renewable energy that 
are constrained by lack of adequate transmission capacity.”3 
Among its many findings, the 2009 NETCS highlighted that the 
gap between the potential for wind development in areas with high 
wind development potential and actual new wind development in 
those areas exists “principally because there is neither adequate 
transmission capacity to deliver wind generation, nor an 
expeditious way to build new transmission for that purpose.”4 
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 1. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2005). 
 2. The next NETCS is currently being prepared and will include an 
examination of “[r]ecent, current and planned transmission and interconnection 
queues.” WORKSHOP NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR COMMENT, 76 FED. REG. 
70122–70123 (Dep’t of Energy Jan. 10, 2011), http://energy.gov/sites/prod 
/files/2012CongestionStudyNov10.pdf. At present, a great deal of uncertainty 
surrounds the release of the upcoming NETCS given, in part, to a U.S. Court of 
Appeals decision in 2011 that vacated DOE’s designations of certain “national 
corridors” based on the NETCS released in 2006. 27-SUM Nat. Resources & 
Env’t 51; see also California Wilderness Coalition v. DOE, 631 F.3d 1072 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 3. Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 
2012 National Electric Commission Congestion Study, ENERGY.GOV, 
http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation 
/transmission-planning/2012-national (last visited Jan. 19, 2013). 
 4. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION 
CONGESTION STUDY 18 (2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files 
/Congestion_Study_2009.pdf. 
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As of the end of September 2012, the United States had a total 
of 51,630 megawatts (MWs) of wind power capacity installations5 
with an additional 8,430 MWs under construction.6 As the 2009 
NETCS recognized, lack of transmission capacity remains a major 
impediment to both the installation of additional MWs and the 
elimination of curtailment of operating wind farms.7 As of the end 
of 2009, there were approximately 300,000 MWs of proposed wind 
projects waiting in interconnection queues.8 Of this figure, roughly 
100,000 MWs were located in the upper Midwest and Central Plains 
regions. Both were identified by the DOE in the 2009 NETCS as 
areas “where it appears that the development of significant 
additional [wind] generation—using existing technology with 
known cost and performance characteristics—is limited primarily by 
the availability of transmission capacity.”9 In the Northeast, it is 
estimated that consumers in New York could save hundreds of 
millions of dollars annually, while also realizing the increased 
“economic benefits of renewable resources” through upgrades to the 
transmission system that would result in reduced congestion.10 
Clearly put, inadequate transmission capacity hinders the 
development of wind power as a source of electricity generation in 
                                                                                                             
 5. For purposes of comparison, total U.S. coal generation capacity is 
342,296 MW and total U.S. natural gas generation capacity is 467,214 MW (this 
numbers are as of November 2011 and are past due to be updated in November 
2012). U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, ELECTRIC POWER 
ANNUAL 2010, available at http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph240/nam2 
/docs/epa.pdf. 
 6. AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, U.S. WIND INDUSTRY THIRD 
QUARTER 2012 MARKET REPORT 3 (Oct. 2012), http://www.awea.org/learnabout 
/publications/reports/upload/3Q2012-Market-Report_Public-Version.pdf. 
 7. MICHAEL DWORKIN ET AL., THE LAW OF CLEAN ENERGY: EFFICIENCY 
AND RENEWABLES 546 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1st ed. 2011) (noting that the 
“lack of available transmission” has had a “clearly material” impact on 
renewable energy development). 
 8. American Wind Energy Association, Annual Statistics on U.S. Wind 
Energy, Year ending 2009 16, http://www.awea.org/_cs_upload/learnabout 
/publications/5094_1.pdf (hereinafter “American Wind Association, Year ending 
2009); see also American Wind Energy Association, Annual Statistics on U.S. 
Wind Energy, Year ending 2008 5, http://www.awea.org/learnabout/publications 
/upload/AWEA-Annual-Wind-Report-2009.pdf (“The proposed wind projects in 
these queues have applied for interconnection to the grid, but most of these wind 
plants cannot be built because there is insufficient transmission capacity to carry 
the electricity they would produce. While not all of these wind projects will 
ultimately be built, it is still clear that wind power development is outpacing the 
expansion and modernization of our electric grid.”). 
 9. Compare U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 4, at 22–23, with 
AMERICAN WIND ENERGY ASSOCIATION, YEAR ENDING 2009, supra note 8. 
 10. FERC Grants ROE Incentive, 3888 PUR Util. REG. NEWS 3 (Sept. 6, 
2008). 
2013] FERC REGULATIONS’ IMPLICATIONS FOR WIND POWER 165 
 
 
 
the United States. The two primary remedies to this deficiency are 
(1) to build out the nation’s transmission system and (2) to 
improve the integration of wind power into the transmission 
system. The avenues for achieving these remedies are to first 
incentivize investment and second to improve planning for better 
integration of wind power into the transmission system. This 
Article examines the mechanisms in place at the federal level to 
facilitate these remedies. Section I provides a brief overview of the 
different levels of government, the regulatory agencies, and other 
organizations involved in the regulation and operation of the 
transmission system. Section II provides an overview and analysis 
of FERC Order No. 679, which is the primary mechanism in place 
to incentivize investment in transmission system assets. Finally, 
Section III examines FERC Order No. 1000, which lays the 
framework to improve transmission system planning, and discusses 
the implications of that measure on facilitating an increase in 
transmission capacity. 
I. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRICITY TRANSMISSION REGULATION 
The regulation of the electricity transmission system occurs on 
several levels. In addition, a number of governmental agencies and 
non-governmental organizations play a role in regulating the 
transmission sector.  
A. The Federal Level  
The federal government first attempted to regulate the 
transmission system through the 1920 Federal Power Act.11 The 
Federal Power Act created the Federal Power Commission—the 
predecessor to the present day Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (“FERC”)—and granted that institution the “authority 
over interstate wholesale electricity trade and its associated 
transmission interconnections and rate-making practices.”12 The 
last piece of significant legislation to amend the Federal Power Act 
and have an impact on the regulatory landscape overseeing the 
transmission system was the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“Energy 
Act 2005”).13 
FERC draws its authority to regulate electricity markets from 
the Federal Power Act. Section 205 of the Federal Power Act 
requires that rate filings be submitted to FERC by public utilities 
                                                                                                             
 11. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 535. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 535–36. 
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engaged in the wholesale electricity market, while Section 206 of 
the Federal Power Act governs rate changes “initiated” by FERC 
or via a third party complaint.14 In both of these instances, FERC is 
mandated to protect consumers and ensure that the rate utilities 
charge is “just and reasonable” and not “unduly discriminatory or 
preferential.”15  
The United States Department of Energy was created in 1977 by 
the Department of Energy Organization Act.16 The DOE has no 
direct authority to regulate the transmission of electricity or the 
electricity market. However, as indicated above, the DOE is 
required by the Energy Act 2005 to conduct a NETCS every three 
years.17 The NETCS is the mechanism through which the DOE 
identifies national interest electric transmission corridors (“NIC”).18 
Once an area is labeled a NIC, FERC has the ability to exercise 
expanded regulatory powers in regard to the “construction or 
modification of electric transmission facilities” within those areas.19 
B. The Regional and State Levels 
Since 1996, FERC has encouraged the concept of Independent 
System Operators (“ISO”) as one method of ensuring non-
discriminatory access to transmission.20 In any transmission 
system, there must be a system operator coordinating the flow of 
electricity.21 An ISO is a system operator that performs this 
function and is “independent of the existing electric utilities and 
other market participants.”22 In the United States, ISOs were first 
formed as the electrical industry’s response to FERC Order No. 
888,23 a rule that called for “nondiscriminatory access to 
                                                                                                             
 14. Id. at 536. 
 15. Id.  
 16. The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-
91, 91 Stat. 565 (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 7101). 
 17. 16 U.S.C. § 824p (2005). 
 18. These corridors are areas that are “experiencing electric energy 
transmission capacity constraints or congestion that adversely affects consumers.” 
16 U.S.C. § 824p(a)(2). See also 27-SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 51. 
 19. 16 U.S.C. § 824p(b); 27-SUM NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 51. 
 20. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/ Independent System 
Operators (ISO), FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, www.ferc.gov/industries 
/electric/indus-act/rto.asp (last updated Nov. 15, 2012). 
 21. WILLIAM W. HOGAN, INDEPENDENT SYSTEM OPERATOR: PRICING AND 
FLEXIBILITY IN A COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET 1 (1998). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities, Recovery of Stranded 
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21540 (1996). 
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transmission service on a regional basis.”24 In response to this rule, 
electricity generators, transmission providers, and utilities united to 
“form voluntary organizations designed to reduce the opportunities 
for transmission owners to discriminate against their transmission 
service customers.”25 ISOs can be statewide or cover a group of 
neighboring states or regions.26 Some ISOs also qualify as 
Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”).  
Although RTOs and ISOs are functionally equivalent, an RTO 
satisfies the requirements of FERC Order No. 2000, which 
includes several mandates relating to operator independence and 
ensuring grid reliability.27 ISOs and RTOs are thus “FERC-
approved regional organizations [that] operate as FERC-
jurisdictional entities.”28 As such, ISOs and RTOs are “required to 
file a tariff with FERC that neither favors nor disfavors” any 
system user and that openly provides transmission system access 
“pursuant to a single, unbundled, grid-wide tariff that applie[s] to 
all eligible users in a non-discriminatory manner.”29 Interstate 
transmission “facilities overseen by RTOs or ISOs must satisfy the 
region’s tariff” that must first be approved by FERC.30 At present, 
there are ten ISOs/RTOs operating in the United States that 
provide electricity to more than two-thirds of U.S. consumers.31  
A utility, generator, or transmission provider that is not part of 
an ISO or RTO must still provide open access transmission service 
to interested third parties. States control transmission siting, and 
transmission siting statutes and regulations vary from state to 
state.32 Additionally, states have jurisdiction over lower voltage 
distribution facilities and retail sales to ultimate consumers. As a 
practical matter, if a utility is vertically-integrated—meaning the 
utility owns generation, transmission, and distribution—the state 
where the utility is located has significant regulatory authority over 
that utility. 
                                                                                                             
 24. Matthew R. McGuire, (Mis)understanding “Undue Discrimination”: 
FERC’s Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries of the Federal Power Act, 
19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 549, 555–56 (2012). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO), supra note 20.  
 27. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 89 F.E.R.C. ¶ 
61,285 (1999) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
 28. McGuire, supra note 24, at 556. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Gabe Maser, It’s Electric, but FERC’s Cost-Causation Boogie-Woogie 
Fails to Justify Socialized Costs for Renewable Transmission, 100 GEO. L. J. 
1829, 1832 (2012). 
 31. The ISO/ RTO Council, ISO/ RTO COUNCIL, http://www.isorto.org/site 
/c.jhKQIZPBImE/b.2603295/k.BEAD/Home.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2013).  
 32. DWORKIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 538. 
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II. INCENTIVIZING INVESTMENT IN TRANSMISSION ASSETS—FERC 
ORDER NO. 679 
Historically, investments in the “upgrade and expansion” of the 
electricity transmission system have lacked any real incentives.33 
Utilities were vertically-integrated and generally required to make 
prudent investments to provide adequate service. Thus, 
investments in transmission had to “compete” for capital internally 
with generation and distribution investments. Difficulties in siting 
long haul transmission lines, with returns on investment no higher 
than normal, generally led to a lack of interest in major 
transmission projects. Transmission lines were typically built to 
move generation to local load. As a result, investment in 
transmission has been deficient over time, and the existing 
infrastructure places “considerable constraints on the amount of 
wind generation that can be absorbed by the grid.”34 The Energy 
Act of 2005 attempted to address this shortcoming by ordering 
FERC to promulgate rules that promote capital investment in the 
“enlargement, improvement, maintenance and operation” of the 
transmission system.35 Toward this end, FERC issued Order No. 
679, which became effective in September 2006.36  
Of particular interest to FERC when promulgating Order No. 
679 was “encourag[ing] investors to take the risks associated with 
constructing large new transmission projects that can integrate new 
generation[,] . . . reduce congestion and increase reliability.”37 As 
such, Order No. 679 allows FERC to facilitate expanded capacity 
and improved reliability in the transmission system by approving 
public utility plans for transmission investment which include 
incentive based rate treatment.38 Rate based incentives, known 
collectively as “Risk Reducing Incentives,” include for example: 
(1) higher return on equity (“ROE”) for transmission projects with 
a higher than “normal” risk level, known as “Incentive ROE”; (2) 
assurance of recovery of abandoned plant costs in the case where a 
project is abandoned for reasons that are beyond the control of the 
                                                                                                             
 33. Emily E. Steinhilber & Jonathan R. Voegele, Taxation and Electricity 
Transmission: Bringing Wind Energy Onto the Grid, in GREEN TAXATION AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY 161 (Larry Kreiser et. al. eds., 2012). 
 34. Id.  
 35. See The Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1241, 119 
Stat. 594, 961. 
 36. Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform, Order No. 
679, 116 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,057, (2006) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter 
“Order No. 679”]. 
 37. Id. at 16. 
 38. Id. at 17–18. 
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public utility; (3) an acceleration in the timing of recovery of new 
transmission investments; and (4) streamlined rate adjustments in 
connection with transmission investment.39 An applicant for such 
rate based incentives must demonstrate in its proposed plans that 
the “facilities for which it seeks incentives either ensure reliability 
or reduce the cost of delivered power by reducing transmission 
congestion,”40 “there is a nexus between the incentive sought and 
the investment being made,” and the “resulting rates are just and 
reasonable.”41 
Through May 2011, FERC received more than seventy-five 
applications for the transmission incentives provided for under 
Order No. 679, totaling around $50 billion worth of transmission 
investments.42 It is anticipated that by the close of the 2008 to 2016 
period, about $36.2 billion will have been deployed.43 This 
represents a sizeable allocation of capital.  
A. Clarifying FERC’s Evaluation of Order No. 679 Rate Based 
Incentive Applications 
On November 15, 2012, FERC issued a Policy Statement that 
provides guidance on how applications for Order No. 679 rate 
based incentives will be henceforth evaluated.44 The clarification 
included in this Policy Statement emphasized the evaluation 
process for Order No. 679 rate based incentive applications. FERC 
will require that both the nexus between the incentive sought and 
the investment being made be highly correlated with the 
requirements of Order No. 679 and that “applicants . . . take all 
reasonable steps to mitigate the risks of a project, including 
requesting those incentives designed to reduce the risk of a project, 
before seeking an [I]ncentive ROE based on a project’s risks and 
                                                                                                             
 39. See generally id. at 49–107 (discussing the various rate based incentives 
adopted by Order No. 679). 
 40. Thus satisfying Section 219 of EPA 2005. The Energy Policy Act of 
2005, supra note 35, at § 219. 
 41. Order No. 679, supra note 36, at 45. 
 42. Notice of Inquiry, Promoting Transmission Investment through Pricing 
Reform, 18 C.F.R. ch. 1 (2011). 
 43. Energy Central, FERC Order 679 Responsible for $23bn of 
Transmission Infrastructure Investment in 2012–2016, BUSINESS WIRE (Jul. 17, 
2012), available at http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20120717005461/ 
en/FERC-Order-679-Responsible-23bn-Transmission-Infrastructure. 
 44. FERC Policy Statement Provides Guidance on Electric Transmission 
Rate Incentives, FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, (Nov. 15, 2012), 
available at https://www.ferc.gov/media/news-releases/2012/2012-4/11-15-12-
E-3.asp. 
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challenges.”45 With this Policy Statement, FERC places a greater 
burden on applicants “to demonstrate how the total package of 
incentives requested is tailored to address demonstrable risks and 
challenges.”46 Specifically, if Risk Reducing Incentives could “. . . 
reduce the risks of the project, that fact will be taken into account 
in any request for an [Incentive] ROE.”47 Even prior to this Policy 
Statement’s issuance, FERC signaled its intention to move toward 
a more conservative approach in evaluating Order No. 679 
Incentive ROE applications in an October 2011 decision to trim the 
Incentive ROE by fifty basis points included in a proposal for a 
major interregional transmission project.48 
Toward this goal, FERC’s Policy Statement details four criteria 
that applicants seeking an Incentive ROE for a proposed 
transmission project’s “risks and challenges” should address in their 
application. First, applicants should “demonstrate that the proposed 
project faces risks and challenges that are not either already 
accounted for in the base ROE or addressed through” the Risk 
Reducing Incentives.49 The Policy Statement suggests that the first 
requirement is satisfied by projects that (1) “relieve chronic or 
severe grid congestion that has had demonstrated cost impacts to 
consumers;” (2) “unlock location constrained generation resources” 
which “previously had limited or no access to the wholesale 
electricity markets;” or (3) “apply new technologies to facilitate 
more efficient and reliable usage and operation of existing or new 
facilities.”50 
The second criteria applicants should provide when requesting 
a “risks and challenges” based Incentive ROE is a demonstration 
that the applicant is taking “appropriate steps and using appropriate 
mechanisms to minimize its risks during project development.”51 
This requirement can be achieved through several actions, 
including requesting Risk Reducing Incentives, mitigating costs 
through best practices in project management, and pursuing joint 
ownership arrangements to “diversif[y] . . . financial risk across 
multiple owners and minimiz[e] siting risks.”52 
                                                                                                             
 45. Promoting Transmission Investment Through Pricing Reform, Policy 
Statement, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,129 (2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 2 & 35) 
[hereinafter “Policy Statement”]. 
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Reforming Order 679: Did FERC Jump the Gun?, 4042 PUR UTILITY 
REGULATORY NEWS 1 (Oct. 21, 2011). 
 49. Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 14. 
 50. Id. at 15. 
 51. Id. at 17. 
 52. Id. at 18. 
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The third showing that Incentive ROE applicants should make 
is “that alternatives to the project have been, or will be, considered 
in either a relevant transmission planning process or another 
appropriate forum.”53 The Policy Statement indicates that this 
requirement “could be satisfied through participation in open 
processes that are already in existence.” Examples of these open 
processes include consideration in an “Order No. 890 or Order No. 
1000 compliant54 transmission planning process” that allows for 
comparison with alternatives or “by a local regulatory body, such 
as a state utility commission that evaluated alternatives . . . and 
determined that the proposed transmission project is preferable to 
the alternatives evaluated.”55  
Finally, the fourth requirement an applicant must meet when 
applying for an Incentive ROE is “to commit to . . . a cost 
estimate.”56 Satisfying this final requirement would, for example, 
require limiting the requested Incentive ROE to the cost estimate 
of the project at the time of RTO approval or utilizing another 
approach to control transmission development costs and improve 
transparency.57 
B. The Policy Statement and the Integration of Wind Power 
Under section 219 of the Federal Power Act, FERC must 
encourage transmission development “while maintaining just and 
reasonable rates” for consumers.58 Clear from the focus of the 
Policy Statement is FERC’s belief that Incentive ROEs put “more 
upward pressure on transmission rates” than Risk Reducing 
Incentives and hence FERC encourages applicants to first examine 
the Risk Reducing Incentives.59 However, as it is the Order No. 
679 rate based incentive that directly improves the financial 
attractiveness of a project, FERC’s granting of the Incentive ROE 
potentially makes an investment in such a proposed transmission 
project particularly appealing. As discussed, the FERC Policy 
Statement narrows the types of projects to which it will grant an 
Incentive ROE, provided applicants can satisfy the requirements.  
Because wind power and most other renewable generation 
resources are “location constrained,” proposed transmission 
                                                                                                             
 53. Id. 
 54. See infra Part III. 
 55. Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 19. 
 56. Id. at 20. The four requirements are collectively referred to as the 
“Policy Statement Four Requirements.” 
 57. Id. at 20. 
 58. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 219 (2005). 
 59. Policy Statement, supra note 45, at 13–14. 
172 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. I 
 
 
 
projects that would “unlock” wind and other renewable resources 
and allow generated electricity to enter the wholesale markets 
would likely satisfy FERC’s first requirement—i.e., that the 
project be unaccounted for by base ROEs and Risk Reducing 
Incentives.60 Significantly, this requirement is the only one which 
prefers a certain group of generation technologies, specifically 
those that are “location constrained,” such as wind and solar. The 
other three requirements would apply equally to all proposed 
transmission projects regardless of the type of generation the 
proposed project serves. Since the Incentive ROE will likely not be 
granted unless all four requirements are satisfied, a proposed 
transmission project that provides generation technology for a 
preferred project will be more financially attractive, and more 
likely be implemented.61 This could further encourage the 
development and integration of renewable generation technologies. 
This point takes on additional importance with the realization 
that the first requirement is the only requirement outside the 
applicant’s control. An applicant controls the following: the steps 
taken to mitigate the project risk, participation in a planning 
process that compares the proposed project against alternatives, 
and its commitment to a cost estimate. With control over these 
three variables, an applicant can tailor its proposal toward 
compliance with the second, third, and fourth requirements. 
However, satisfaction of the first requirement, which is implicitly 
project-type specific, is not an adjustable variable. Therefore, if all 
other considerations are equal, projects that satisfy the first 
requirement will be favored, since they are more likely to receive 
an Incentive ROE. This again suggests that the Policy Statement 
will have a positive impact on integrating and promoting wind 
power and other renewables. 
In addition to the rate based incentives discussed above, 
FERC’s recent Order No. 1000—which reforms both transmission 
planning and cost allocation policies, and eliminates the right of 
first refusal that public utilities have historically enjoyed in 
constructing and owning transmission—will likely be highly 
effective in promoting transmission system expansion.62 
                                                                                                             
 60. See supra Part II(i). 
 61. And hence is eligible for the Incentive ROE if the other three of the 
Policy Statement’s four requirements are satisfied. 
 62. Bryce W. Radford, First Refusals, Least Regrets, 148 No. 12 PUB. UTIL. 
FORT. 22 (2010). 
2013] FERC REGULATIONS’ IMPLICATIONS FOR WIND POWER 173 
 
 
 
III. IMPROVING TRANSMISSION PLANNING—FERC ORDER NO. 1000 
In July 2011, FERC issued Order No. 1000 in an effort to build 
upon FERC Order No. 890, which was a prior effort to promote 
regional transmission planning.63 Although Order No. 890 did 
result, to some extent, in the “improved . . . ability of wind 
generation to access transmission,” it still had some shortcomings.64 
Just like Order No. 890, Order No. 1000 focuses on process 
rather than outcome. But it includes both the stipulation that public 
utility transmission providers participate in more comprehensive 
planning, and cost allocation activities that better account for the 
integration of wind power and other renewable sources of 
generation. As noted in Order No. 1000, the major deficiencies of 
Order No. 890 included inadequate transmission planning 
requirements and a lack of transmission cost allocation procedures, 
both of which hindered transmission infrastructure expansion.65 
Order No. 1000 addresses both of these shortcomings. 
A. Changes to Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation: 
Improving the Conditions for Integration of Wind 
One requirement found in Order No. 1000 is that public utility 
transmission providers (“PUTP”) participate in the regional 
transmission planning process where such PUTP is located, as long 
as the regional transmission planning process satisfies Order No. 
890 transmission planning principles,66 and actually does produce 
a regional transmission plan.67 In addition, PUTPs in neighboring 
planning regions must implement procedures to “identify and 
                                                                                                             
 63. Proposed Rule, at 1–2. Preventing Undue Discrimination and 
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 Fed Reg. 112266, FERC 
STATS. & REGS. ¶ 32,660 (2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 & 37) 
[hereinafter “Order No. 890”]. 
 64. U.S. Department of Energy, National Electric Transmission Congestion 
Study (Dec. 2009), available at http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Congestion 
_Study_2009.pdf. 
 65. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 136 FERC 
STATS. & REGS. ¶ 61051, at 31–32 (2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) 
[hereinafter “Order No. 1000”].  
 66. The Order 890 transmission planning principles are (i) coordination; (ii) 
openness; (iii) transparency; (iv) information exchange; (v) comparability; (vi) 
dispute resolution; (vii) regional participation; (viii) economic planning studies; 
and (ix) cost allocation for new projects. See Grace S. Kurdian, et al., Energy 
and Natural Resources Market Regulation, 2011 ABA ENV’T ENERGY, & 
RESOURCES L.: YEAR IN REV. 181, 181 (2012). 
 67. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 57; STEVEN FERREY, 1 L. OF INDEP. 
POWER § 8:10 (2012). 
174 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. I 
 
 
 
jointly evaluate transmission facilities” that span both regions.68 
Finally, regional transmission planning processes must, when 
determining transmission needs, account for69 public policy 
considerations—including any renewable portfolio standard 
requirements.70 FERC views these as critical requirements, 
because local transmission plans may not include the 
considerations in regional level plans that would ultimately lead to 
more cost-effective and efficient transmission planning.71 This is 
important to renewable power generation and to wind power 
specifically, because such resources often sit near state borders and 
far from population centers.72 The regional transmission planning 
process is typically the more appropriate forum for “reliably and 
cost-effectively integrating location-constrained renewable energy 
resources.”73 
Order No. 1000 also includes transmission cost allocation 
requirements. These requirements state that the regional 
transmission planning process, in which the PUTPs participate, 
must adopt a regional cost allocation method for new transmission 
facilities. Any such method should take into account the “expected 
beneficiaries” of the planned transmission project and 
“appropriately” allocate the cost of new transmission among 
consumers such that costs are borne by those receiving the benefits 
from the project.74 FERC has made clear that the Order No. 1000 
cost allocation requirements are intended to give PUTPs flexibility 
in determining the composition of the cost allocation methods, but 
requires that the method developed satisfy six specified cost 
allocation principles.75 For transmission projects that span two or 
                                                                                                             
 68. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 57. 
 69. This includes both “identify[ing] transmission needs driven by Public 
Policy Requirements and evaluat[ing] potential solutions to meet those 
identified needs.” Shelly Welton & Michael B. Gerrard, FERC Order 1000 as a 
New Tool for Promoting Energy Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 ENVTL. 
L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11025 (2012) (emphasis in original). 
 70. Kurdian, et al., supra note 66, at 182. 
 71. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 55, 64.  
 72. Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 503 (2011). 
 73. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 66. 
 74. Id. at 369; FERREY, supra note 67, at § 8:10. 
 75. The cost allocation principles include (i) proportional allocation of costs 
commensurate with estimated benefits; (ii) prohibition of involuntary allocation 
of costs to non-beneficiaries; (iii) use of reasonable benefit-to-cost ratio in 
determination of whether a transmission facility should be selected in a regional 
plan, such that no facility with significant net positive benefits is excluded; (iv) 
confinement of cost allocation within the relevant planning region, unless the 
outside region voluntarily agrees to assume a portion of the costs; (v) use of 
transparent methods in determining benefits and identifying beneficiaries; and 
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more regions, the same cost allocation requirements apply. In 
addition, the regional cost allocation method adopted for 
interregional projects must be common among the PUTPs in the 
neighboring planning regions and satisfy the cost allocation 
principles.76 These changes are of primary importance for wind 
power integration because the growth of renewable generation 
partly drives the urgent need for new interregional transmission 
facilities. Sources of renewable generation, especially wind, are 
“frequently remote from load centers” and thus necessitate 
transmission facilities that traverse several regions.77 
Certain commentators to the proposed Order No. 1000 felt that 
the “deficiencies in transmission planning and cost allocation 
processes [of Order No. 890]” resulted in a large number of 
planned transmission projects not being built.78 One commentator 
highlighted the “lack of transmission expansion” as the reason for 
“significant congestion in areas with extensive operating wind 
generation” and that “curtailments primarily caused by [such] 
congestion” were getting worse over time.79 FERC views the 
transmission planning and cost allocation requirements in Order 
No. 1000 as crucial to support efficient and cost-effective 
investment decisions that will fund the transmission upgrades 
required to “meet reliability needs and integrate new sources of 
generation.”80 As wind power holds tremendous potential as a 
source of electricity generation, the ability of the U.S. transmission 
system to integrate new sources of wind is crucial.  
B. Eliminating the Right of First Refusal and Improving Conditions 
for the Build Out of Transmission to Integrate Wind 
Another important aspect of Order No. 1000 is the elimination 
of the right of first refusal for an “incumbent transmission provider 
with respect to transmission facilities” located within its territory.81 
Prior to Order No. 1000, a PUTP had the option to build and own 
                                                                                                             
 
(vi) the freedom of PUTPs to choose different cost allocation methods for 
different facilities, such as those required for reliability, congestion relief, or to 
achieve public policy goals. In addition, cost allocation methods must be 
explained in the compliance filing of the PUTP. See Kurdian, et al., supra note 
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 76. Order No. 1000, supra note 65, at 416–17. 
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 78. Id. at 36–40. 
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 81. Id. at 345. 
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new transmission lines located within its jurisdiction.82 In practice, 
this privilege stifled the ability of merchant developers and 
independent transmission companies who covet the stable revenue 
streams offered by transmission projects to bid on these 
transmission projects.83 This is especially true in regions with large 
renewable energy potential, particularly wind, where “developers 
[have] been . . . literally falling over one another in a race to lock 
down key markets and rights-of-way” for transmission projects.84 
Although the elimination of the right of first refusal has the 
potential to facilitate transmission system expansion and thus 
indirectly promote the integration of wind generation, this mandate 
lies at the cuff of FERC’s statutory authority. As such, it remains 
to be seen whether the elimination of the right of first refusal 
through Order No. 1000 will survive judicial scrutiny. On the one 
hand, there is little precedent to support the extension of federal 
jurisdiction to protect against discrimination in transmission 
construction.85 In fact, recent jurisprudence has reaffirmed that 
transmission construction traditionally falls within the bounds of 
state regulatory authority.86 In an attempt to justify the expansion 
of its jurisdiction under Order No. 1000, FERC clarified that its 
elimination of the right of first refusal “excludes a new 
transmission facility if the costs of that facility are borne entirely 
by the [PUTP] in whose retail distribution service territory or 
footprint that new transmission facility is to be located.”87 
However, FERC goes on to clarify that any allocation of the costs 
of a new facility outside its service territory or footprint requires a 
regional cost allocation method application, and thus any such 
transmission facility cannot be considered a local transmission 
facility.88 In framing its jurisdiction argument, FERC is stating that 
the elimination of the right of first refusal is not an attempt to 
preempt state jurisdiction or force states to cede statutorily 
assigned regulatory privileges,89 but is instead a legitimate attempt 
to remedy “unduly discriminatory” and preferential treatment in 
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 84. Id. 
 85. McGuire, supra note 24, at 577–78. 
 86. Id. at 579. 
 87. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning 
and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000-B, 141 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,044, 61, 
159 (2012) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter “Order No. 1000-
B”]. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 314 (4th Cir. 
2009). 
2013] FERC REGULATIONS’ IMPLICATIONS FOR WIND POWER 177 
 
 
 
transmission facility construction, which is placed within FERC’s 
regulatory purview90 once cost allocation is spread throughout the 
region.91 
CONCLUSION 
The electricity transmission system in the United States lacks 
capacity. This inadequate level of transmission infrastructure 
hinders the integration of wind power generation into the grid and 
thus inhibits wind power development. The DOE has identified 
several areas of the country where improving transmission capacity 
could directly increase the number of wind power installations. In 
an attempt to facilitate the build out of the transmission system, the 
federal government has put in place several programs to encourage 
investment in infrastructure and improve the regional planning 
process to better integrate wind generation facilities into the grid. 
Both FERC Order No. 679 and FERC Order No. 1000 can have a 
continued positive impact on transmission expansion. As long as 
there exists a need for more capacity, FERC will undoubtedly push 
to extend its jurisdictional reach in an attempt to facilitate 
transmission expansion. 
  
                                                                                                             
 90. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012). 
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